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Peter Abailard, whose life  and works span from  1079 to 1142, is probably the most 
notorious figure  of  that period. His contributions to twelfth-century  logic and 
metaphysics have long been recognised. In many quarters he is heralded as the first 
moderate realist on the question of  universals. In others, given his resolute 
commitment to determinism, he is proclaimed as the last of  the Stoics. More recently, 
Abailard has attracted attention as the medieval champion of  a distinctive kind of  moral 
philosophy, one which, like Stoic and Kantian ethics, focuses  upon an agent's 
conceptualisation of  her action.1 Abailard infamously  dismisses the value of  works. No 
action is per se permissible or impermissible. The moral value of  an act is entirely 
derived from  the moral value of  the intention of  the agent in performing  the act. While 
ethics is the underlying concern in the majority of  Abailard's writings, this topic 
receives explicit philosophical analysis in only two of  his major works: Ethica2  and 
Dialopfus  inter  Philosophum,  Iudaeum  et Christianum.3 
The Dialogus  is a mature work, yet it remains one of  Abailard's least-known 
texts. Its precise dating is a disputed matter though general consensus places it after 
1135.4 The text has received limited attention and, until recendy, virtually no philo-
sophical exegesis.5 As Pierre Payer well noted two decades ago, the work is not a 
shining example of  the literary form  promised by its title. The text features  a series of 
very protracted speeches instead of  the terse and snappy tempo one might expect to 
encounter in a dialogue. Further, Abailard testifies  to the breadth and depth of  his 
knowledge by including numerous and lengthy textual citations. Despite these liter-
ary flaws  the text warrants close study. In this work Abailard characteristically applies 
logic to important human issues and he does so with some surprising results. 
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The Dialogus'  discussion divides into two parts. In the first  collado the Philoso-
pher and the Jew discuss the nature and role of  the Law.6 The second collatio, which 
is a discussion between the Philosopher and the Christian, focuses  on the summum 
hominis bonum. Herein, Abailard works out a forceful  and innovative account of 
goodness. This paper focuses  on a small portion of  his account and uncovers a signif-
icant disparity between early medieval views of  "goodness" and the conceptions of 
their predecessors by way of  examining the confrontation  between Christian and 
pagan conceptions of  "goodness." The Christian conception is Abailard's and he con-
fronts  the Stoics. My analysis provides an account of  Abailard's attack on the Stoic 
position and I expose the underlying motives of  the attack.7 More importandy, I 
argue that Abailard's main argument fails  and that this failure  points to a rivalry 
between two distinct conceptions of  "goodness": the absolute and the relative. 
Degrees  of  Happiness 
Abailard's doctrine on the supreme good is presented in his Dialogus  inter  Philosophum, 
Iudaeum  et Chñstianum.  The question, "Does happiness admit of  degrees?" is raised 
by the Christian about halfway  through the debate between himself  and the 
Philosopher. If  happiness is a reward, then does every good man obtain the same 
reward, or does the reward vary according to merit? Prior to this point, the Christian 
and Philosopher have agreed to a number of  incontrovertible principles. First, they 
have agreed that a distinction must be drawn between the supreme good in itself  and 
the supreme good of  man.8 Second, the supreme good of  man is defined  as that which 
makes one blessed; both maintain that it is to be found  in the future  life.9  Finally, 
virtue and the supreme good are not identical, and if  they are at all related, then the 
supreme good must be the reward for  virtue. The issue which arises next in the text is 
a dilemma concerning degrees of  beatitude. Assuming that men are not equally 
virtuous, must it not follow  that there is a corresponding diversity of  rewards?10 The 
horns of  the problem are these: If  there is not a diversity and each receives the same 
reward, then some people will receive greater reward than they deserve, and others 
will receive substantially less than they deserve. On the other hand, if  there is a diversity 
of  reward, then there must be degrees of  beatitude. Yet, something can only be called 
the supreme good if  nothing greater than it can be found.11  So, it follows  that only 
the highest degree of  happiness can properly be called the supreme good of  man. In 
this case, only the best person will obtain the supreme good.12 
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The paradox has the following  explicit rendering: 
Primary  Assumption: 
There is a diversity of  blessedness in heaven corresponding to the diversity 
of  virtue on earth. 
Secondary  Assumption: 
"X" cannot be called the supreme good of  man if  some good, "Y," can be 
found,  and the goodness of  CCY" is greater than that of  "X." 
Disjunctive  Conclusion: 
Either every good man, regardless of  the extent of  his merit, obtains the 
supreme good, or only the man who has no one more blessed than he 
obtains the supreme good. 
Taken together these suppositions entail a contradiction. The problem is clearest if  we 
reconstruct it in terms of  a particular case. Imagine two human beings, John and Paul, 
about whom these facts  are granted: 
Supposition 1 John is virtuous and therefore  has merit. 
Supposition 2 Paul is virtuous and therefore  has merit. 
Supposition 3 John is more virtuous than Paul. 
From this it follows  that, 
4 John has greater merit than Paul. 
But, from  4 and the Primary Assumption it follows  that, 
Sub-conclusion 5 John will be more blessed than Paul. 
From 5 it follows  that, 
6 The beatitude of  John is a greater good than the beatitude of  Paul. 
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From 6 and the Secondary Assumption, it follows  that, 
7 The beatitude of  Paul cannot be called the supreme good. 
Principle A 
8 The supreme good is that which, when attained, makes one blessed. 
From 7 and 8 it follows  that, 
9 Paul will not be blessed. 
On the other hand, 
Principle Β 
10 The supreme good is the reward for  merit. 
From 2 and 10 it follows  that, 
11 Paul will obtain the supreme good. 
However, from  8 and 11 it follows  that, 
Conclusion 12 Paul will be blessed. 
But 12 contradicts 9. 
There are two straightforward  ways to avoid this contradiction. One alternative 
is to reject the primary assumption. With this option, either diversity of  merit among 
good men must be denied, or the conclusion that all good men attain the supreme 
good and are equally blessed despite differing  merit must be accepted. The other 
alternative is to avoid the implication that only the best human being will be blessed 
by rejecting the secondary assumption. Abailard pursues his own way. He tries to 
escape the predicament without rejecting either of  the relevant assumptions. He con-
tends both that, 
1 There is a diversity of  reward corresponding to the diversity of  merit, 
and that 
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2 All good men obtain the supreme good. 
At this point in the Dialogus'  debate, Abailard's Philosopher pursues one of  the 
straightforward  alternatives. The Philosopher denies the claim that there is a diversity 
of  merit. According to a variety of  classical positions, all the virtues are present at the 
same time in all good men. The strategy is to argue that all good men are equally 
blessed because all good men are equally virtuous.13 
The  Equality  or  Inequality  of  Good  Men 
Support for  the claim that all good men are equally virtuous is drawn from  authority 
and scripture. Cicero introduces the view that all the virtues are present at the same 
time in all good men.14 The Philosopher claims that Cicero reports that all philosophers 
agree, "he who has one virtue has them all," and further,  "he even equates evil men in 
sins so that he adds that all sins are equal."15 Additional support is derived from 
Christian authorities. Abailard's Philosopher appeals to Augustine, who said, "Where 
charity is, what can be lacking? Where it is absent, what can possibly be profitable?"16 
Furthermore, according to the Apostie, "love is the fulfilment  of  the law including all 
goods within it while excluding all evils."17 Finally, there is Christ's proclamation, 
'There is no greater love than this: to lay down one's life  for  one's friends."18  Together, 
these points are evidence for  the general argument that if  Charity contains everything 
in itself  and carries everything with itself  and if  whatever contains everything in itself 
does not admit of  degrees, then it follows  that Charity does not admit of  degrees. The 
argument concludes, "If  no one is superior to another in charity, he is certainly not so 
in virtue of  merits since charity includes every virtue."19 If  good men are equally good, 
then there is no need to suppose that happens to establish that there is a diversity of 
merit. Consequently, the Christian is challenged to establish that there is a diversity 
of  merit. 
This issue is of  vital importance to Abailard. In an extensive monologue, the 
Christian character presents seven distinct arguments.20 For my purposes, it will suf-
fice  to consider, in detail, only the most crucial of  these arguments. It is nonetheless 
necessary to position this argument within the underlying strategy. Abailard distin-
guishes two senses of  the term "virtue." The first  and general sense is defined  as that 
"which obtains merit with God." In this sense, only charity counts as a virtue. The 
second and specific  sense (which is also the traditional usage) defines  "virtue" as 
"that which makes a person just or strong or temperate."21 "Virtue" is the term 
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which applies to those individual habits of  mind, which, when present in humans, 
lead them to exhibit the corresponding quality. Abailard is keen to make this distinc-
tion so that in one sense it is true that all good men are equally virtuous and in a dif-
ferent  sense it is true that all virtuous men are not equally virtuous. 
The general sense of  "virtue" requires the presence of  each species of  virtue for 
correct application. A virtuous human must be just, temperate, strong, and wise. 
According to this view, it is the specific  virtues, such as temperance or justice, that 
admit of  degrees or diversity. In short, Abailard is prepared to grant the classical prin-
ciple that a person cannot properly be said to possess any one of  the virtues unless 
she possesses them all. However, he will insist that one particular person may be 
more just and less charitable than another, while yet another is more prudent but less 
honourable than either of  those—the degree to which any person is called upon to 
exhibit such qualities and the fervour  with which she answers this calling will vary 
with circumstances. In other words, from  the proposition, 
A all the virtues (however many particular qualities one wishes to include) are 
present at the same time in all good men. 
It does not follow  that, 
Β every virtue is in all good men to the same degree, or in some good man to 
the same degree all of  the time. 
If  this claim can be justified,  then all good men need not be equally virtuous. Only 
good men will be saved, but good men need not be perfectly  virtuous. However, this 
distinction between two senses of  "virtue" requires the assumption that one person's 
justice, or temperance, can be greater or less than that of  another. This involves a 
conception of  virtue which substantially differs  from  Platonic, Neoplatonic, Epicurean 
and especially Stoic doctrine. 
The most substantial and convoluted argument in the series cuts to the very 
heart of  Stoic moral doctrine. Abailard cites Cicero's Paradoxa  stoicorum  according to 
which, 
All good men are equally good for  no one is better than a good man. Simi-
larly, no one is more temperate than a temperate man.2 2 
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In order to counter the claim that all good men are equally good, Abailard focuses  on 
the logic of  the typically Stoic assertion, "no one is better than a good man."23 As one 
might expect from  his reputation, Abailard's solution requires the acceptance of  some 
rather subtle distinctions. Cicero's phrase, "No one is better than a good man" is 
equivalent to Abailard's first  formulation, 
1 There is no one better than a good man.2 4 
Abailard wants to assert, 
2 Someone is better than a good man.25 
The first  proposition is a direct contradiction of  the second, yet, Abailard will claim 
that the two are compatible provided one interprets the latter correctly.26 Abailard is 
not claiming that "just any old person" is better or happier than a good man. He is 
arguing for  the consistency of  1 and 2 in order to affirm  that a good man may be 
better than a good man. 
Abailard's attempt at conciliation should be analysed in two stages. In the first 
stage, he distinguishes between, 
A Someone is better than a (every) good man.2 7 
and Β Someone is better than a (some particular) good man. 
In the second, he distinguishes between Β and, 
C Someone is better than some particular good man is good. 
Throughout, Abailard focuses  on the relation, "x is better than a good man." In the 
first  stage, the meaning of  "x is better than a good man" is considered. Suppose that, 
"x is better than a good man" means ccx is better than every good man." If  we were to 
take the person Bob, then on this interpretation, "Bob is better than a good man" 
means, 
Bob is a man and Bob is good and for  all y, if  y is a man and y is good, Bob 
is better than y. 
However, a problem immediately arises. Since Bob is a man and Bob is good, Bob 
can be substituted for  y, and it follows  that Bob is better than Bob. But this is absurd. 
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Something cannot be better than itself.  Thus, the supposition that "x is better than a 
good man" means "x is better than every good man" must be rejected. Abailard thinks 
he has hereby identified  the source of  absurdity within the sophism, "All good men 
are equally good for  no one is better than a good man."28 
For the sake of  contrast, if  we take the special case of  God's goodness we are not 
faced  with a similar problem. "God is better than a good man" simply means "God is 
better than all men." Literally, "God is good and for  all y, if  y is a man and y is good, 
then God is better than y." God cannot be substituted for  y, since God is not a man, 
and we are therefore  not led to an absurd result.29 
When we speak of  human goodness, on the other hand, if  we take "a good man" 
as a universal, the sophism implies that, if  Paul is a good man, then no one is better 
than Paul, which further  implies that Paul, like God, is above all men. However, if 
John is also a good man, then no one is better than John. But if  Paul is above all 
men, Paul must be above John. However, if  Paul is above John, then John is not as 
good as Paul, in which case, someone is better than John, namely Paul. Therefore, 
it will either be impossible to claim concurrendy that both men are good, or it must 
be granted that if  both men are good, they must be equally good. Neither of  these 
options will suit Abailard. He wants to be able to attribute goodness to more than 
one person while nonetheless maintaining that good people are not equally good. 
Thus, Abailard introduces a further  distinction, one between saying that, 
Β Someone is better than some good man. 
and 
C Someone is better than some good man is good.3 0 
The former  contradicts the statement, "No one is better than a (some) good man," 
while the latter does not. The first  relation is a relation between individuals. If  particular 
good men are substituted for  the existential quantifier,  then the relation has the form, 
"A is better than B." The second relation does not compare individuals. Rather, it 
compares the attributes of  individuals who possess an attribute. This relation has the 
form,  "A's x-ness is greater than (less than /equal to) B's x-ness." If  the distinction is 
granted, then it can be true that Paul is not better than a good man, and nonetheless 
also true that Paul is better than another good man is good. Abailard thinks the 
distinction allows for  the consistency of  the following  proposition, 
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There is an χ, such that χ is a man and χ is good, and there is a y, such that y is 
a man and y is good and the goodness of  χ is greater than the goodness of  y. 
The sophism, Abailard thinks, involves a fundamental  mistake. He assumes the 
Stoics try to prove that all good men are equally good along the following  lines: 
If  it is true that, 
1 No good man is better than a good man, 
then it is false  that, 
2 Some good man is better than a good man. 
If  2 is false,  then 
3 Each good man is equally good. 
On Abailard's account, the truth of  1 does not entail the falsity  of 
4 The goodness of  some good man is greater than the goodness of  a good man. 
If  his distinction is granted, Abailard can insist that the goodness of  good men need 
not be equal.31 But what is the basis for  these distinctions? Abailard's first  point 
concerning the ambiguity of  "a good man" is not problematic. Typically, context must 
determine whether "a man" means "some man" or "every man." However, it is fair  to 
ask, which does the context of  Stoic moral doctrine demand, and what sense can be 
made of  Abailard's second distinction? 
The  Stoic  Conception 
What does it mean to say, "the goodness of  Paul is greater than the goodness of  John"? 
Abailard's distinction between Β and C makes "goodness" the subject of  comparison 
and this assumes that "goodness" can be quantified  and that one agent can have a 
greater measure of  it than another. Thus, Abailard would have us transform  a claim 
such as "Alfred  is good and Bob is good" into "the goodness of  Alfred  and the goodness 
of  Bob" before  undertaking any comparison. However, it is not clear that "the 
goodness of  Alfred  is greater than the goodness of  Bob" could be meaningful  within 
a Stoic context. In the Paradoxa  stoicorum,  which Abailard explicidy cites, Cicero 
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accurately outlines the intent of  the Stoic position. Cicero points out that 
"transgressions are not to be measured by their results but by the vices of  the persons 
transgressing." The Stoics would reject the claim that one evil man differs  from  another 
because he effects  more harm through his action than the other. The relevance of  varied 
circumstances is also denied, 
...the act of  transgressing is itself  one, whichever way you twist it. Whether 
the helmsman capsizes a ship with a cargo of  bullion or a barge loaded with 
chaff  makes some litde difference  in the result, but none in respect of  the 
helmsman's incompetence....since to transgress is to cross over the lines, 
which once done, an offence  has been committed; how much further  you 
go when once you have crossed the Une has no effect  in increasing the 
offence.  It is unquestionable that transgression is not allowed to anybody; 
but what is not allowed depends only upon the single point of  being proved 
not to be allowed; if  this fact  of  not being allowed cannot ever become 
greater or smaller, since the action's being a transgression consists in its not 
having been allowed, the transgressions springing from  the fact  of  non-
allowance must necessarily be equal.32 
By this view any act which is a transgression is so designated because it has been 
forbidden.  If  adultery is a sin, then, on the Stoic view, it matters litde whether one 
adulterer commits the transgression with greater fervour  than another. Both have 
committed the same act regardless of  the circumstances, results, or effects  of  the 
offence,  since both have done what is forbidden. 
The claim that virtues are equal is supported in a similar manner. Immediately 
following  the lines cited by Abailard,33 it is asked, 
Will you call a man who pays back ten pounds of  gold when as the money 
had been entrusted to him without a witness he could easily have pocketed 
it without punishment, if  he fails  to do the same in the case of  a sum of  ten 
thousand pounds? or temperate who restrains himself  in one sort of  excess 
but lets himself  go in another? Virtue in harmony with reason and unbro-
ken constancy is one—nothing can be added to it to make it virtue in a 
greater degree and nothing can be taken away from  it and yet the name of 
virtue be left  to i t .3 4 
Cicero attributes this view to Socrates. It is especially typical of  the Stoic conceptual 
framework.  The argument advanced by Abailard contradicts this position, but it does 
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nothing to undermine it. Abailard does not direcdy address any of  the principles which 
serve to ground such a view of  virtue. By the classical view, virtue is a kind of  perfection. 
A temperate man is so called on account of  his perfect  temperance. If  Paul and John 
are temperate men, then they are equally temperate; for  no one could achieve a greater 
degree of  perfection  than that which makes these men temperate. Perfection  is not a 
function  of  degrees. Abailard's interpretation of  the proposition, "No one is better 
than a good man," jettisons this conception of  goodness. Abailard imagines that it 
makes sense to say that Paul is more temperate than John is temperate. But if 
temperance requires perfect  moderation, then how can John be less than perfecdy 
moderate yet nonetheless be considered temperate?35 The notions of  harmony, order, 
perfection  and consistency which figures  such as Socrates, Chrysippus, Seneca, and 
Boethius associate with virtue and consequently with the term "good" are ones which 
preclude the notion of  degrees. If  virtue is a land of  perfection  which may be 
approached but not exceeded, then a human being is not properly called virtuous until 
she has attained this limit.36 Abailard's arguments are surprisingly weak given the 
importance of  the issue. This failure  to confront  the traditional position raises 
important questions: Is Abailard's argument simply a failure?—just  another instance 
of  philosophers begging the question? Or, is the Stoic's conception of  goodness 
fundamentally  different,  and therefore  incommensurable with Abailard's? Is Abailard's 
failure  simply a failure  to fully  appreciate an alternative conceptual framework? 
Absolute  and  Relative  Attributes 
According to the Stoic picture, "goodness" is an absolute attribute. Something is either 
good or not good. Consequendy, the Stoics could not accommodate comparisons of 
the kind Abailard has in mind. One Stoic sage is not "better" than another Stoic sage. 
For the Stoics, Nature is good, and persons are good in the same sense, that is to say, 
the same "thing" is attributed to both the rational principle which governs the universe 
and to the Sage. On the other hand, Abailard treats goodness as a relative attribute. 
For Christians, only God can be perfecdy  good and man's goodness is always of  a 
lesser degree than God's. Others certainly shared Abailard's conviction on this point. 
Henry Chadwick points out that Clement of  Alexandria "rejects the Stoic doctrine that 
goodness and virtue in God do not transcend the goodness and virtue of  the perfect 
wise man."37 If  the goodness of  God does transcend the goodness of  human beings, 
as Abailard and Clement think, comparative degrees of  goodness emerge. If  divine 
goodness and human goodness are not different  in kind but only in degree, then 
goodness must be quantifiable. 
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What does the difference  between Abailard's conception and that of  the Stoics 
amount to? The difference,  I think, becomes clearest if  we reflect  upon absolute and 
relative concepts generally. Examples of  absolute notions include "ftill,"  "complete," 
"consistent," "unchanging," "developed," and their opposites "empty," "inconsis-
tent," and so on. These notions are closely associated with those conceptions of 
goodness most likely to be characterised as absolutist. If  "goodness" is absolute, then 
it will share the conceptual features  of  notions such as "being full"  or "being consis-
tent." Examples of  relative notions include "tall," "heavy," "old," "strong," "large" 
and their opposites. If  "goodness" is a relative notion, then it should be conceptually 
similar to other relative notions. 
Absolute attributes are absolute in the sense that their underlying standards are 
not subject to change over time or according to circumstances. The notion of  "being 
full"  involves an absolute standard. A cask of  wine is full  if  and only if  no more wine 
can be added to the cask. This kind of  standard sets a ceiling above which there is no 
greater degree. Comparative and superlative degrees fall  below the absolute standard. 
A wine cask may be more full  than it is empty, but this means the cask is neither full 
nor empty. It does not mean that it is full  or that it is full  to some degree. For abso-
lutists "goodness" is absolute just as "being full"  is absolute.38 Ethicists who regard 
"goodness" as an unchanging ideal often  express this in terms of  perfection,  the full 
and harmonious development of  human faculties,  a thing's expression of  its excel-
lence or the full  and complete development of  certain capacities. If  a capacity is fully 
developed, it cannot be developed to any greater degree. 
Furthermore, given their absolute character, absolute attributes eliminate certain 
kinds of  comparisons. If  we decide that Cask A is full  of  wine and that Cask Β is also 
full,  then strictly speaking, we could not also suggest that Cask A is more full  than 
Cask B. Such a comparison is incompatible with the meaning of  "full."  Each cask is 
either full  or it is not full.  We can, however, compare casks which are not full.  We can 
meaningfully  assert that one cask is "just about full"  while the other is "nowhere near 
full."  However, this does not entail that the first  is "more full"  or full  to a greater 
degree than the second. Such a claim leads to the impression that the casks are being 
direcdy compared and are "not equally-full."  In fact,  the casks can only be indirecdy 
compared. Each cask must be measured against an absolute standard. In terms of 
such an absolute standard the casks are "equally not-full."39 
Once a full  cask of  perfect  wine has been produced, this cask cannot be distin-
guished, in these respects, from  a second full  cask of  perfect  wine. If  "good" means 
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full,  complete, and perfect,  and both casks of  wine are full,  complete and perfect, 
then both casks of  wine are good.40 Since one cannot be more or less full,  complete 
or perfect  than the other, both casks are equally good. Thus, no wine is better than a 
good wine. It is in this sense that the Stoics maintain that good men are equally 
good—as they must be if  goodness is absolute.41 Abailard's rejection of  the view that 
good men are equally good requires relinquishing this conception of  "virtue" and 
"goodness." Therefore,  there is a substantially different  conception at work within 
Abailard's doctrine. 
"Being tall" and "being full"  are different  kinds of  attributes. Qualities such as 
"tall" and "strong" and their opposites "short" and "weak" are "relative" in a number 
of  senses. First, "being tall" is relative to kind. What is tall for  a human being is not 
tall for  an oak tree. Also, "being tall" is relative within a kind. Comparative and 
superlative degrees of  relative notions fall  both above and below the standard. If, 
these days, anyone who is at least six foot  counts as a tall human being, then John, 
who is 6'2", is tall and he is also taller than Paul, who is 6 T \ Furthermore, Mary, 
who is 5'6", is not tall but she is nonetheless taller than Peter who is 5'5". Finally, the 
standard itself  is relative.42 What counts as "tall" in one context may not count as 
"tall" in another. Comparisons among individual things in terms of  relative attributes 
make sense. John is tall, but Paul is taller, while Peter is tallest. Relativists understand 
"being good" in the way we understand "being tall." 
If  we recognise this difference  between relative and absolute attributes and cou-
ple it with Abailard's distinction between "being better than a good man" and "being 
better than some good man is good" we see that Abailard is a relativist about "good-
ness." Just as we think that, among tall men some tall men are taller than others, 
Abailard thinks that among good men, some good men are better than others.43 But 
this is not the Stoic's conception of  goodness. The Stoics are absolutists about 
"goodness" and this fact  underlies their claim that "no one is better than a good 
man," just as a distinction between "being fuller  than a full  wine cask" and "being 
fuller  than some full  wine cask is full"  is not intelligible within an absolutist concep-
tual scheme. Thus Abailard side-steps rather than confronts  the Stoic position. Abail-
ard's objection assumes that goodness, like tallness, admits of  degrees. But this is 
exacdy what the Stoics would deny. Thus, Abailard begs the question. 
Whether "being good" is defined  in absolute or in relative terms makes a sub-
stantial amount of  difference.  As noted, this issue clearly mattered to Abailard. His 
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interest in these qualifications  may, in part, derive from  Aristotle's remarks in the 
Categories.44  Aristotle asserts that qualities, generally, admit of  degrees, 
Things qualified  as of  a certain kind do admit of  degree. One thing is said 
to be more or less white or more or less just than another; and a particular 
thing may acquire more of  a quality—a thing that is white can become still 
whiter. This is not true of  all qualities, but of  most of  them (Categories  8). 
Aristode conceives of  most qualities as being relative in the sense I have described. 
However, Aristode contrasts qualities such as being white, literate or just with 
attributes such as being circular. The latter are absolute in the sense I have described. 
But "triangular" and "square" do not seem to admit of  degree, nor indeed 
do any of  the other shapes. For, although things that admit of  the definition 
of  "triangle" or "circle" are all triangles or circles respectively, none of  the 
things that do not admit of  them can be said to be more or less "triangular" 
or "circular" than any other. A square is no more of  a circle than an oblong 
is, since neither of  them admits of  the definition  of  circle. And in general, if 
neither of  two things admits the definition  of  what is under consideration, 
neither of  them will be described as having its character more than the 
other; so that not all things that are qualified  as of  a particular kind admit of 
degree (Categories  8). 
Aristode provides an effective  test for  distinguishing absolute and relative qualification. 
Can we say of  something which does not admit of  the definition  of  an attribute, that 
it nonetheless has the character of  the attribute to some degree or other? If  we cannot, 
then the qualification  is absolute. If  we can, then the qualification  is relative. Whether 
or not the qualification  is absolute or relative will depend entirely upon the attribute's 
definition.  More significantly,  this definition  will be driven by some overriding 
conceptual scheme. The difficulty  Abailard faced  in confronting  the Stoics becomes 
evident if  we try to apply Aristode's test. Let us apply this test to the case of  moral 
goodness. For example, let us suppose that neither John nor Paul is a good man 
according to some definition  of  goodness. If  being good is defined  in absolute terms 
such as "being logically consistent," then we cannot describe John as good to a greater 
extent than Paul. This feature  of  absolute attributes is quite plain. However, if  being 
good is defined  in relative rather than absolute terms, then we will be able to describe 
John as good to a greater extent than Paul even though neither is good, strictiy 
speaking. The test will tell us, given some definition  of  an attribute, whether a given 
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qualification  is absolute or relative. However, it will not tell us whether the 
qualification  should be absolute or relative, nor will it tell us how to define  a particular 
attribute. Abailard's dispute with the Stoics is a dispute over the definition  of  goodness 
itself.  Since their respective definitions  belong to different  conceptual schemes, there 
could be no victor and our inheritance is the spoils. 
Within the context of  the Dialogas,  the Christian seemingly forces  the Philoso-
pher to admit that there is a diversity of  merit among good men. This, coupled with 
the symmetrical relation between merit and reward, requires that there be a corre-
sponding diversity of  reward. According to this interpretation beatitude will admit of 
degrees and those who are saved will not be equally blessed.45 The Dialogus  proceeds 
onward from  here. But we will stop and reflect  upon the fact  that Abailard's failure 
causes us to recognise two very different  conceptions of  goodness—conceptions 
which are incommensurable. The impasse encountered by Abailard has implications 
which extend beyond the confines  of  Abailard's Dialogus.  The relative conception of 
"goodness" found  in Abailard's twelfth-century  doctrine is not the conception which 
dominates classical moral theory. Nonetheless, the relative conception has dominated 
post-medieval ethical theory and it has become the common, everyday conception of 
goodness. 
For many of  us, the absolute conception of  goodness is an affront  to common 
sense and consequendy we are inclined to think that the burden of  proof  falls  to the 
Stoics (absolutists). Indeed, our unreflective  intuitions favour  the relative concep-
tion, and the Stoic conception initially strikes us as highly restrictive—to a fault.  By 
the Stoic analysis, "a good man" is a very rare commodity. Socrates was reportedly 
the only candidate, to the Stoics, for  the tide of  "Sage" and opinion seems to have 
been divided even about him. We, on the other hand, frequendy  do compare individ-
uals in terms of  their "goodness" or "virtuous qualities" and we often  believe that 
one person is a better human being than another. We say that both people are good 
but neither is perfect. 
In contrast, when we reflect  upon our intuitions concerning a virtue such as 
"honesty" the clear waters of  relativity quickly become muddied. "Being honest" 
seems more like "being logically consistent" than like "being tall." "Being honest" 
and "being consistent" both invoke the notion of  "truth." Most of  us would not 
grant that someone who tells the truth some of  the time is an honest man. We would 
not grant this for  the same reason that we would not grant that a set of  sentences, 
some of  which are true and some of  which are false,  is a consistent set of  sentences. If 
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we can trust a friend  only under some sets of  circumstances, we would not say that 
she is trustworthy By the measure of  public sentiment, a good politician is presum-
ably one who keeps all promises, not just a favoured  few  Good politicians are also a 
rare commodity and opinions do not seem to be divided about that. In other words 
there are, perhaps despite ourselves, some clearly "absolutist" intuitions mingled 
together with our otherwise "relativist" convictions. In my view, contemporary dis-
course on matters of  "goodness" often  runs these two distinct conceptions together. 
This, it seems, is a direct consequence of  the complexities of  our double inheritance. 
Our study of  Abailard's attack on the Stoics indicates that at some point in the 
history of  ideas, two competing conceptions of  "goodness" did battle. The relative 
conception appears to have won the day, yet there are no grounds for  thinking that 
the absolute conception actually lost the war. These two incommensurable concep-
tions continue to do battle and sometimes generate theoretical chaos. At the very 
least, it is important to recognise the roots underlying common sense views of 
"goodness." Better yet, we ought to refrain  from  using different  conceptions inter-
changeably and, if  possible, decide which of  the two conceptions is the better one. 
Success in this venture promises the elimination of  some prevailing confusions  and 
contradictions and the expectation that future  value theory can be good value theory. 
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1 Peter King, "Abelard's Intentional Ethics" The  Modern  Schoolman:  A Quarterly 
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Notion of  Intention;" John Marenbon, Philosophy  of  Peter  Abelardo  Calvin Normore, 
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2 Abailard, PetriAbaelardi  abbatisRugensis  opera omnia\ see PetriAbaelardi  opera, 
ed. Victor Cousin, and Peter  Abelard's  Ethics  ed. Luscombe. Abailard's Ethics  is known 
by two tides, Ethica  and Scito  Teipsum. 
3 Abailard, Dialogas  inter  Philosophum,  Iudaeum  et Christianum,  ed. Thomas, 
henceforth,  Dialogas.  Unless otherwise noted all Latin citations are from  this edition. 
Abailard,A  Dialogue  ofa  Philosopher  with  ajew and a Christian  trans. Payer, henceforth, 
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Dialogue.  Unless otherwise noted, translations are Payer's. Paul Spade has recendy 
published new translations of  both the Dialogas  and the Ethica. 
4 There have been two traditional sides to the debate. These have fallen  on either 
side of  the Council of  Sens, 2 June 1140. The older tradition, following  G. Robert, 
and including J. Jolivet and R. Thomas, identifies  the Dialogus  as Abailard's last work, 
allegedly written at Cluny just prior to his death in 1142. This tradition holds that the 
Dialogus  was composed after  the Ethics.  See Jolivet, "Abélard et le philosophe," pp. 
181-9, and Thomas, "Die Persönlichkeit Peter Abaelards," pp. 256-60. According to 
Mews, Robert's dating is accepted by a number of  scholars, including Sikes, Peter 
Abailard,  pp. 267-268; D. Van Den Eynde, "La chronologie," pp. 467-80; Geyer and 
Ueberweg, Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  Π,  p. 216; Gilson, La philosophie  au 
moyen âge, p. 292; R. Oursei, "La dispute et la grâce," p. 82; H. Liebeschutz, 'The 
Significance  of  Judaism in Peter Abelard's Dialogus," pp. 1-18. For a complete list, 
see Mews, "On Dating the Works of  Peter Abelard," pp. 73-134. Contrary to Robert, 
Buytaert has argued that the Dialogus  ought to be dated earlier and he pinpoints 1136 
as the most likely time period. Buytaert argues that Abailard's reference  to being 
persecuted is a reference  to the council of  Soissons rather than to the council of  Sens 
and Buytaert further  maintains that Abailard would have felt  too defeated  after  the 
council of  Sens to have written the self-congratulatory  claims presented in the preface 
to the Dialogus.  See Buytaert, "Abelard's Collationes," pp. 33-38 and his "Abelard's 
Expositio in Hexaemeron." More recendy, Mews has argued that both the Dialéctica 
and the Dialogus  should be dated much earlier in Abailard's life  than has hitherto been 
thought. Mews maintains that Abailard composed the Dialogus  around 1125 while he 
was teaching at the Paraclete. Luscombe argues that the Ethica  and the Dialogus  were 
written concurrentiy between 1134 and 1139. On the basis of  Luscombe's work it 
has been generally accepted that the Dialogus  was issued prior to the Ethica relatively 
late in Abailard's life;  see Luscombe, "Introduction," Peter  Abelard's  Ethics,  p. xxx. 
5 On the basis of  a philosophical analysis of  the plot of  the Dialogue, I have argued 
against Mews' supposition that this text should be dated as early as 1125. For the 
details of  this argument, see J. Allen, "On the Dating of  Abailard's Dialogus,"  pp. 135-
151. 
6 References  to "the Philosopher" and "the Christian" are to Abailard's characters 
in the Dialogue. 
7  Abailard's attack against a stoic conception of  "goodness" may puzzle scholars 
familiar  with the important respects in which Abailard's views were influenced  by 
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various pagan philosophies and especially by stoic metaphysics and moral theory. 
However, as a Christian, Abailard must part company with his stoic comrades on this 
issue for  two reasons. First, within the context of  the Christian tradition, God's 
goodness transcends the goodness of  human beings. Only God is good in an absolute 
sense. Second, Abailard's own experiences must have convinced him that people are 
sinful  or pure to a varying extent. 
8 Dialogus  98-105, Dialogue  88-96. Also see Cicero, Delnventione  157-8. The 
supreme good in itself  is God, while the supreme good of  man is distinct from  God, 
and must be defined  in terms of  man's relation to God. 
9 The philosopher Abailard presents in the Dialogue  is a good ancient philosopher. 
He believes in God's existence, the immortality of  the soul, and the promise of  a 
determinate afterlife. 
10 Quero igitur, an in ilia beatitudine alius alio beatior sit, sicut hie alternum alio 
iustiorem vel sanctiorem esse contingit, ut videlicet secundum diversitatem 
meritorum sit et remuneratio diversa. Dialogus  106-107, Dialogue  98. 
11 Earlier the Christian insisted that, "It is not the case that something is the 
supreme good if  something greater can be found."  Nemo  recte summum bonum dicit, 
quo maius aliquod  invenitur.  Dialogus  106, Dialogue  98. As Payer notes, this echoes 
Anselm's formula,  "that than which none greater can be conceived." Anselm, 
"Proslogion," 1-4. Thomas has compared Abelard and Anselm in Der philosophisch-
theologische  Erkenntnisweg,  pp. 215-220. 
12 Immo, quia ita est, oportet, concedas alium ibi hominem alio beatiorem effici 
nec per hoc eius hominis beatitudinem, que minor est, nequaquam summum 
hominis bonum esse nuncupandum. Unde nec ilium, qui minus alio beatus est, 
iam beatum dici convenit. Summum quippe bonum id diffinisti,  quo cum quisque 
pervenerit beatus est; aut igitur ilium, qui alio ibi minor est, summum bonum 
adeptum esse concesseris, aut eum minime beatum esse concesseris, sed eum 
tantummodo, quo nemo ibi sit beatior. Si enim id, quod adeptus est, eum beatum 
efïicit,  profecto  iuxta suprapositam diffinitionem  summum bonum illud dici 
convenit. Dialogus  107, Dialogue  99. 
13 Multis namque philosophorum visum est / omnibus bonis hominibus omnes 
simul inesse virtutes nec eum ullatenus bonum censeri, cui virtus aliqua desit, ac 
per hoc omnium bonorum hominum nec in mentis vite nec in beatitudinis 
remuneratione ullam esse distantiam. Quod si forte  ita sit, eadem omnibus 
beatitudo retribuitur, et omnes equaliter summum bonum adepti pariter fiunt 
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beati. Dialogus  108, Dialogue  100. The explicit argument runs: 
1 If  all good men are equally virtuous, there is not a diversity of  merit. 
2 If  there is not a diversity of  merit, then each good man obtains the same reward. 
3 If  each good man obtains the same reward, then all good men attain the supreme 
good. 
4 If  all good men attain the supreme good, all good men are equally blessed. 
14 Abailard has the Stoic position clearly in mind here. He cites Cicero's De Officiis 
and Paradoxa  Stoicorum  as his source. In xhtParadoxa  Stoicorum  Cicero sympathetically 
explores some of  the most extraordinary ethical views of  the Stoic school. Paradoxa 
Stoicorum.  Elsewhere, Cicero rejects these doctrines; see De Finibus  4.74. 
15 qui unam habet, omnes habere virtutes  and qui etiam in Paradoxis  non solum in 
virtutibus  bonos verum etiam inpeccatis  ita  equat malos,  ut omniapeccataparia/  esse astruat 
Dialogus  108, Dialogue  100-01. Cicero writes: 
Atqui quoniam pares virtutes sunt, recte facta  quando a virtutibus proficiscuntur 
paria esse debent, itemque peccata quoniam ex vitiis manant sint aequalia necesse 
est. CA philosophis,' inquis, 'ista sumis.'" Paradoxa  Stoicorum  3.23. 
16 Ubi est caritas, quid est, quod possit deesse? Ubi vero non est, quid est, quod 
possit prodesse? I Cor. 13; Dialogus  109, Dialogue  101. 
17 Tlenitudo quippe legis est dilectio.'(Rom. 13:10). Quam ipse, qui hoc dicit, 
Apostolus plenitudinem prosequens et tarn mala inde removens, quam ibi bona 
comprehendens ait: 'Karitas patiens est, benigna est. Karitas non emulatur, non 
agit perperam et cetera.' Dialogus  109, Dialogue  102. 
18 ut autem Xpistus meminit: / 'Maiorem hac dilectionem nemo habet, ut animam 
suam ponat quis pro amicis suis.' (Jn 15:13) Dialogus  109, Dialogue  102. 
19 Quod si caritate nemo alium transcendit, utique nec in virtutibus aut meritis, 
cum omnem, ut dicis, caritas complectatur virtutem. Dialogus  110, Dialogue  101. 
20 Dialogus  110-13, Dialogue  101-06. 
21 Reveram, si proprie virtus intelligatur, que videlicet meritum apud Deum 
optinet, sola caritas virtus appellanda est. Que quidem pro eo, quod iustum efficit 
vel fortem  seu temperantem, iustitia recte dicitur vel fortitudo  sive temperantia. 
Dialogus  110, Dialogue  102. 
22 Cicero writes: "atqui pares esse virtutes nec bono viro meliorem nec 
temperante temperantiorem nec forti  fortiorem  nec sapiente sapientiorem posse 
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fieri  facillime  potest perspici. Paradoxa  Stoicorum  3.21, quoted by Abailard at 
Dialogus  110, Dialogue  103. 
23 Dialogus  110-111, Dialogue  102-103. Although Abailard focuses  on the logic 
of  the claim the real issue is whether "goodness" (in its nature) admits of  degrees. 
Derek Parfit  discusses a parallel example in "Later Selves and Moral Principles": 
There is a sense in which all our relatives are equally our relatives. We can use the 
phrase "related to" so that what it means has no degrees; on this use, parents and 
remote cousins are as much relatives. It is obvious, though, that kinship has 
degrees. This is shown in the phrase, "closely related to": remote cousins are, as 
relatives, less close. I shall summarise such remarks in the following  way. On the 
above use, the fact  of  being someone's relative has in its logic no degrees. But in 
its nature—in what it involves—it does have degrees. So the fact's  logic hides its 
nature. Hence the triviality of  the claim that all our relatives are equally our 
relatives. 
The corresponding claim that all good men are equally good is not trivial from 
Abailard's point of  view. He will argue that "goodness" has degrees in its logic and its 
nature. See Derek Parfit,  "Later Selves and Moral Principles," p. 477. 
24 Also equivalent, "It is false  that someone is better than a good man." Etsi  enim 
bono viro non sit  aliquis  melior.  Dialogus  110-11. 
25 tarnen aliquo  bono viro melior  est. Ibid. 
26 It is worth pointing out that each of  1 and 2 can be interpreted in two ways; 
the first  may mean, 
la It is not the case that there is an x, such that χ is a man and for  all y, if  y is a 
man and y is good, then χ is better than y. 
or it may mean, 
l b It is not the case that there is an x, such that χ is a man and χ is good  and for 
all y, if  y is a man and y is good,  then χ is better than y. 
The second may be interpreted as, 
2a There is an x, such that χ is a man and A is a man and A is good and χ is better 
than A. 
or it may mean, 
2b There is an x, such that χ is a man and χ is good  and A is a man and A is good 
and χ is better than A. 
The term "better" creates a second ambiguity. If  "better" means "more good," then 
l b says, "all good men are equally good." If  "better" means "happier" or "having 
greater well being," then la says, "no one is happier or better off  than a good man." 
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The latter is commonly claimed by ancient moral theorists, including Plato, Aristotle, 
Plotinus, Epicurus and the Stoics. The former  is characteristic of  the Stoic position. 
271 owe recognition of  the first  stage of  the argument and the clarity of  my 
understanding of  this passage to Paul Spade. I concur with Spade's diagnosis of  the 
pertinent issue in relation to what I identify  as only the first  stage of  Abailard's 
argument. Spade notes: 'The sentence doesn't mean there is a big difference  between 
the two formulations  used there. Instead it means there's a big difference  between 
either of  those two formulations  (in both of  which one is compared to some particular 
good man) and the more general formulation  discussed earlier (where one is compared 
to good men at large). Syntactically, the discussion rests on whether the expression 
describing what one is compared to contains a particular (that is existential) 
quantifier."  Peter Abelard, Ethical  Writings,  p. 108 n45. Spade does not recognise the 
second stage in the argument. 
28 Cicero, Paradoxa  stoicorum  3.21; Dialogus  110, Dialogue  103. 
29 Given that Christ is man and God is Christ, it might be thought that God can 
be substituted for  y. However, Abailard's analysis of  the attribution of  predicates to 
Christ suggests that he would have rejected such a substitution. According to Nielsen, 
Abailard distinguishes between predications which are literal or proprie and those 
which are merely figurative  or improprie. By Abailard's analysis "Christ is both the 
substance God and the substance man....However, the proposition, Deus est homo can 
never be literal, as God's nature is not man's, for  which reason he describes it as 
figurative  or improprie....If  we say, therefore,  that God is man, according to Abelard 
this merely means that God is united, unitus,  with man in the one person of  Christ" 
(Nielsen, Theology  and Philosophy,  pp. 220-21). Also see Abailard, Dialéctica,  pp. 132/ 
3-5 and Abailard, Opera omnia, col. 624D, 1107AB, 1273D-1274A. 
30 Etsi enim bono viro non sit aliquis melior, tamen aliquo bono viro melior est. 
Quid est enim aliud dicere de aliquo, quod sit melior bono, nisi quod sit melior 
quam bonus vir, quicunque ille sit. Non enim, cum Deum homine dicimus 
meliorem, aliter intelligimus, nisi quod omnes transcendat homines. Sic etiam 
cum tamen aliquem bonum dicimus virum bono viro meliorem, id est quam 
bonus vir sit vel quam sit aliquis vir bonus, non aliter accipiendum videtur, nisi 
generaliter omnibus bonis viris ille preponatur. Quod omnino falsum  est, cum 
ipse etiam sit aliquis bonorum virorum. Si enim melior sit quam bonus vir vel 
quam sit aliquis bonus vir, consequens videtur, ut neque bonus vir ñeque aliquis 
bonus vir sit adeo bonus, sed si quis bonus sit, eo minus sit bonus. Multum itaque 
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referre  videtur, si quis dicatur melior aliquo bono viro et meüor, quam sit aliquis 
bonus vir. Dialogus  111, Dialogue  103. 
31 He can also maintain that, "No one is better than a good man" in the sense 
that "No one is happier or better off  than any good man." The distinction seems to 
allow Abailard to have it both ways. 
32 Cicero, Paradoxa  Stoicorum  3.20-21. 
33 That is, "No one is better than a good man, no one more temperate than a 
temperate man, no one braver than a brave man, nor anyone wiser than a wise man." 
34 Cicero, Paradoxa  Stoicorum  3.21-23. 
35 Ibid.  3.26. Cicero draws the following  conclusion concerning transgressions 
or vice: "How could they appear smaller in size, when every transgression is a 
transgression caused by the dislocation of  system and order, but when system and 
order have once been dislocated nothing further  can be added to make a greater degree 
of  transgression appear possible?" 
36 It should be noted that some Stoics admit of  the possibility of  making moral 
progress. This factor  may have muddied the waters for  Abailard and adversely affected 
his understanding of  the Stoic's conception of  virtue. 
37 Henry Chadwick, Early  Christian  Thought,  p. 46. The relevant Clement texts 
are Stromateis,  ii.135.3; vi.114.5; vii.88.5. See Clement of  Alexandria, "Stromata," 
Fathers  of  the second century  and Stromata,  Liber 1-3. 
38 The adverbial forms  of  absolutes combine well with other absolutes, but they 
do not combine well with relative notions. Phrases such as "completely full"  or "fully 
developed" make sense. Phrases such as "absolutely tall" or "completely strong" do 
not make sense. 
39 If  this treatment of  the term "full"  seems idiosyncratic, consider the term 
"complete" in a variety of  contexts. Ordinary language abuses both terms. In certain 
contexts it seems valid to draw comparisons according to which one thing is said to 
be more or less complete than another. However, consider a complete English sentence 
or a complete symbolic sentence. Here, "complete" is clearly absolute. Given two 
incomplete phrases or symbolic formula,  it is not the case that one is more "complete" 
than the other or that one is more a sentence than the other. If  attributes such as "full," 
"complete," "perfect"  have an absolute sense (even if  they do not always have an 
absolute sense), then it is reasonable to suppose that "good" also has an absolute sense 
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within certain contexts. If  "good" has both an absolute and a relative sense, then it is 
crucial to determine which sense is intended within a particular context. 
40 In his Physics,  Aristode defines  excellence in terms of  perfection.  "When 
anything acquires its excellence, it is then called perfect,  for  then it is most natural— 
as a circle is perfect  when it becomes most a circle, when it is best." Physics,  246a 13-
16. In the Metaphysics,  we are told that a thing's excellence is a kind of  fulfilment  of 
the thing in relation to its end. According to Aristode, "Excellence is a completion; 
for  each thing is complete and every substance is complete, when in respect of  the 
form  of  its proper excellence it lacks no part of  its natural magnitude. The things which 
have attained their end, this being good, are called complete; for  things are complete 
in virtue of  having attained their end." Metaphysics,  1021b, 20-21. 
41 Seneca defines  man's telos as perfect  reason: "perfect  reason is man's peculiar 
good....Therefore  every thing, when it has perfected  its own good, is praiseworthy 
and has reached the end of  its own nature, and man's own good is reason, if  he has 
perfected  reason, he is praiseworthy and has attained the end of  his nature. This perfect 
reason is called virtue and it is identical to rectitude." Seneca, AdLucilium  epistolae 
morales,  76.9-10. Also see, "Letters," 1:63D, p. 63. According to the report of 
Diogenes Laertius, "Another particular definition  of  the good which they (the Stoics) 
give is cthe natural perfection  of  a rational being qua rational'" (Lives  of  the Eminent 
Philosophers  2.8, pp. 95-96). 
42 What constitutes a tall human being today in North America differs 
substantially from  what constituted a tall human being among the inhabitants of 
Jonathan Swift's  imagined Lilliput. 
43 There is a different  sense in which attributes such as tall are "relative." If  Paul 
is six feet,  then Paul is tall for  a man but is short for  a tree. If  John is strong, then he 
is strong compared to other men but weak compared to an ox. I am not claiming that 
what I have called "absolute attributes" cannot be "relative" in this second sense. What 
is good for  a human being may not be good for  a horse. Nor does my use of  the term 
"absolute" imply that such an attribute cannot be lost. The cask of  wine may be full 
today, but with any luck it won't be full  tomorrow. Similarly, good may be qualified 
of  something under certain conditions and not in others. However, if  a thing is good, 
in the absolute sense, then it is not the case that it could be better. 
44 Sec Dialogas  101, 102,115 and 117; Dialogue  92, 93,109, 111. 
45 The requirement that beatitude admit of  degrees exerts an extraordinary 
pressure on Abailard's definition  of  the supreme good and evil for  human beings. 
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Instead of  defining  the supreme good as a final,  joyful  state, Abailard defines  it as love 
of  God and he defines  the supreme evil as hatred of  God. This leads to a number of 
further  puzzles which force  Abailard to conceive of  the supreme good as "unlimited." 
Marilyn McCord Adams has wonderfully  captured the essence of  Abailard's conception 
of  the two post death states with her phrases, "a gracious spiral of  ever-increasing love 
and bliss" and "a vicioius spiral of  hatred and torment." Adams, "Introduction," Peter 
Abelard, Ethical  Writings,  p. xviii. 
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